Biosimilars Deals 2021

Samsung Bioepis AU Pty Ltd v Janssen Biotech, Inc. (Costs) [2024] FCA 1099

Stasiuk v Monster Energy Au Pty Ltd (No 3) [2024] FCA 1052

Rakman International Pty Limited v Boss Fire & Safety Pty Ltd (No 3) [2024] FCA 914

Background

As patent proceedings involve substantial legal expenses, parties typically employ various mechanisms to optimise cost recovery, often by issuing Calderbank letters as well as formal Notices of Offer under the Federal Court Rules, which place the receiving party at risk of indemnity costs orders should the other party receive a more favourable judgment than the terms proposed in the offer.

The financial implications can be significant: while standard party/party costs orders typically result in recovery of approximately 60% of actual legal costs, an indemnity costs order can lead to recovery of up to 100%.

Here, we report on three recent decisions that demonstrate the Federal Court’s nuanced approach to costs orders and the consideration of settlement offers: Samsung Bioepis v Janssen, Stasiuk v Monster Energy Au, and Rakman International v Boss Fire & Safety.

Samsung Bioepis v Janssen

In January 2024, Samsung Bioepis AU Pty Ltd (Samsung) commenced proceedings against Janssen Biotech, Inc. (Janssen) seeking to revoke two certified innovation patents, AU2023100041 and AU2023100042 (the Old Patents), entitled ‘Safe and effective method of treating ulcerative colitis with anti-il12/il23 antibody’, citing certain prior art to allege a lack of novelty and innovative step.

In February, Janssen notified Samsung of new innovation patent application filings (AU2024100006, AU2024100007 and AU2024100016) (the New Patents) which excluded endpoints referred to in Samsung’s prior art citations.  Samsung opposed Janssen’s intention to incorporate the New Patents into the existing proceedings prior to certification.  Janssen subsequently agreed to proceed with a November 2024 trial date while reserving its rights in respect of the New Patents.  After the New Patents were certified in August 2024, Janssen filed separate proceedings rather than amending the pleadings (as it had foreshadowed earlier in March).  Justice Downes ordered the initial proceedings to be discontinued with Janssen to pay Samsung’s costs, prompting Samsung to seek indemnity costs, or alternatively on a special basis per James Hardie International Finance BV v CSR Limited [2007] FCA 366.

Consideration and Outcome

Justice Downes considered the following factors, ultimately rejecting Samsung’s application for indemnity costs or costs on a “James Hardie” special basis:

1. Accrual of significant time and expense

Justice Downes noted that Samsung filed the proceedings without notice to Janssen and immediately sought to expedite them.  Samsung pushed for a November 2024 trial date despite knowing about the New Patents and the possibility that Janssen would seek to amend to include the New Patents.  Justice Downes concluded that this undermined Samsung’s complaint about accrued time and expenses.

2. Surrender of Old Patents

Justice Downes rejected Samsung’s argument that Janssen’s lack of explanation as to the surrender of the Old Patents implied awareness of a weak case.  Her Honour found that Janssen likely filed the New Patents as a safeguard against potential losses and to strengthen its position generally.  Noting Janssen’s earlier intention to prosecute both the Old and New Patents, Justice Downes inferred that the decision to surrender was recent and thus declined to conclude that Janssen prolonged the pursuit of a hopeless or unmeritorious case.

3. Disclosure of Intentions

Samsung complained that Janssen did not suggest that it would rely on the New Patents instead of the Old Patents.  Justice Downes, however, found no evidence that Janssen always intended to abandon the Old Patents, considering it just as likely that Janssen waited for the New Patents’ certification before deciding to surrender the Old Patents.

4. Impact on the Dispute

Justice Downes considered that if Janssen had not surrendered the Old Patents and agreed to the discontinuance orders, a trial would have proceeded in November 2024 where Samsung, if successful, would only receive costs on a standard basis.  By surrendering the patents and consenting to discontinue the initial proceedings, her Honour observed that Janssen helped reduce costs and narrow the issues in dispute.

Stasiuk v Monster Energy Au

In April 2023, Joseph Stasiuk sued Monster Energy Au Pty Ltd (Monster) for infringement of his expired patent AU2006202191 (the ‘191 Patent) entitled ‘Laser-etched pull tab container opening devices and methods of making the same’.

Justice Nicholas ultimately dismissed Mr Stasiuk’s proceedings in March 2024 because he failed to fulfil a security for costs order, to file a Notice of Address for Service (Mr Stasiuk no longer had Australian legal representation and was based in the Cayman Islands) and to file evidence in chief on infringement.  Monster sought its costs of the proceeding on an indemnity basis to be assessed in a lump sum.

In seeking indemnity costs, Monster relied on two settlement offers:

1. A July 2023 Calderbank offer on a “walk away” basis where each party would bear their own costs.  The offer explained that Mr Stasiuk’s likely unrecoverable costs would exceed the maximum possible damages (estimated at US$76,000 based on an existing third-party licence agreement for patents within the same family as the ‘191 Patent).  Monster applied the royalty rate used in that licence, which it considered to be highly favourable to Mr Stasiuk, to the total number of Monster Cans sold in Australia during the relevant period, despite Monster maintaining that many of those cans did not incorporate the allegedly infringing feature.  Stasiuk counteroffered for US$20 million, arguing that the existing licence was not comparable as it was negotiated during the patent’s “infancy”, and with a willing licensor as opposed to a “flagrant infringer”.

2. A November 2023 Notice of Offer to Compromise (pursuant to r 25.01 of the Federal Court Rules) of US$220,000 plus costs (which included a 1.5x higher royalty rate and additional US$100,000 for supplementary damages), which Mr Stasiuk also rejected.

Consideration and Outcome

Justice Nicholas held that the July 2023 Calderbank ‘walk away’ offer was not a genuine compromise, observing that it was reasonable for Mr Stasiuk to reject an offer to discontinue proceedings with each party bearing its own costs, especially given the early stage of proceedings and unclear prospects at the time.

However, his Honour held that Mr Stasiuk unreasonably rejected the November 2023 offer considering its favourable terms (1.5x royalty rate plus additional damages and costs), appropriate consideration time (14 days) and clear expression.  Further, since Mr Stasiuk had access to Monster’s Product and Process Description for two months and had attended mediation at the time of offer, Justice Nicholas inferred that Mr Stasiuk no longer believed the costs and uncertainty of pursuing the case to be justified.  In accordance with r 25.14(2) of the Federal Court Rules, Justice Nicholas ordered Mr Stasiuk to pay Monster’s costs on a party/party basis before 1 December 2023, and indemnity costs thereafter.

Justice Nicholas also ordered that Mr Stasiuk pay Monster’s costs on a lump sum basis given his overseas residence in the Cayman Islands, failure to pay security for costs, and lack of legal representation after December 2023.  Adopting the ‘broad brush’ approach taken by Jackson J in Frigger v Trenfield (No 12) [2022] FCA 900, his Honor calculated Monster’s costs at AUD$522,947.98, but notably excluded Monster’s request for potential costs for enforcing the order in the Cayman Islands as this exceeded the Court’s jurisdiction.  Citing Coshott v Burke (No 2) [2018] FCAFC 81, Justice Nicholas applied a minor reduction to AUD$520,000 to account for possible overestimation.  Having rejected Monster’s second offer, Justice Nicholas’ orders represented an AUD$850,000 turnaround for Mr Stasiuk (not including his own legal costs), highlighting the consequences of non-compliance with court orders and the risks involved in rejecting reasonable settlement offers.

Rakman International v Boss Fire & Safety

Rakman International Pty Limited (Rakman) and Trafalgar Group Pty Ltd (Trafalgar Group) (together, Trafalgar) sued Boss Fire & Safety Pty Ltd (Boss) and its sole director, Mark Prior, for infringement of patent AU2017101778 (the Patent).  Boss counter-claimed seeking revocation as well as relief for unjustifiable threats and misleading conduct under the Australian Consumer Law.  Justice Yates found all patent claims invalid, meaning Trafalgar’s infringement case failed (though his Honour noted if the patent was valid, Trafalgar would have succeeded against Boss, but not Mr Prior).  While Boss’ unjustifiable threats claim failed, they succeeded in proving Trafalgar engaged in misleading conduct regarding a letter sent to building industry firms making statements concerning Boss’ conduct.

On costs, Trafalgar argued they should receive 90% of their infringement claim costs as it had succeeded on construction and infringement, subject to Justice Nicholas’ adverse findings on validity.  Trafalgar further submitted that it should only pay 30% of Boss’ cross-claim costs, estimating a significant portion of Boss’ written submissions and evidence addressed grounds of revocation which were abandoned or else failed.

Boss sought indemnity costs based on Trafalgar’s rejection of a July 2019 settlement offer (the Offer) to discontinue proceedings if Trafalgar paid 80% of Boss’s costs.  Justice Yates initially found Trafalgar’s rejection of the Offer to be unreasonable, thus engaging r 25.14(2) of the Federal Court Rules, and consequently ordered indemnity costs thereafter.

Trafalgar subsequently appealed, with the Full Court finding that an offer to merely discontinue proceedings would have left the Patent’s validity “at large” with no contractual barrier preventing Boss from bringing fresh revocation proceedings.  The Full Court ordered costs of the proceeding (including the cross-claim) on a party/party basis, and remitted the matter back to Justice Yates to determine what discount, if any, should apply to Boss’ costs to account for matters that were abandoned or unsuccessful.

Submissions

Trafalgar proposed that Boss receive costs on a global basis with a 60% discount for matters that were abandoned or unsuccessful.  Boss characterised this as a “deep discount” and argued that Trafalgar’s conduct in the proceedings was “wasteful”.  Citing Burchett J in Australian Conservation Foundation v Forestry Commission of Tasmania (1988) 81 ALR 166, Boss further submitted that although it raised grounds which it abandoned at trial or else were rejected, they were not raised unreasonably and so should not be penalised.  Finally, Boss submitted that its offer, and Trafalgar’s failure to accept it, remained relevant to the Court’s broad discretion in making an appropriate costs order.

Consideration and Outcome

Justice Yates emphasised Boss’ comprehensive victory, noting it had established invalidity, defeated the alleged infringement claim against Mr Prior personally, and succeeded in its misleading conduct claim against Trafalgar.  Nevertheless, his Honour was satisfied that some discount should be applied.  In reaching this conclusion, Justice Yates noted that:

1. Boss’ failed patent construction arguments were reasonable, supported by expert evidence, and formed a limited part of the case.  Justice Yates further observed that given Boss’ failed unjustified threats claim shared a factual basis with their successful misleading conduct claim, a discount in respect of this failed claim was not warranted.

2. Boss succeeded in establishing invalidity based on disclosures made at the ‘Seltor meeting’ (which his Honour found to be novelty-destroying).  While some invalidity grounds failed (utility and claim support), Justice Yates noted these were not Boss’ primary validity challenges and were partly determined by the construction issues.  Nevertheless, his Honour held that this warranted some discount as the utility ground proceeded on a misunderstanding of the invention.

3. Some discount should be applied for grounds which Boss abandoned, including the abandoned ground of lack of sufficient description.

4. In relation to the claims that were abandoned by Boss as part of its lack of novelty case or else were decided against it, Trafalgar had mounted a “fantastical” and “fruitless” attack on Boss’ evidence which it was forced to defend and which unnecessarily complicated the case.  His Honour also noted that, where Boss’ evidence did not independently prove lack of novelty, it was relevant to, and corroborative of, the evidence of what transpired at the ‘Seltor meeting’.  Consequently, his Honour held that a discount was not warranted with regard to these aspects of its cross-claim.

Noting the impossibility of precisely calculating the appropriate discount, based on his Honours experience of the trial and analysis of the evidence, Justice Yates determined a 20% discount was fair – rejecting Trafalgar’s “extravagant” 60% reduction proposal as unjust.  As a final observation, Justice Yates stated that Trafalgar’s rejection of the Offer was not relevant to his Honour’s determination.

Conclusion

These decisions illustrate that the strategic deployment and formulation of Notices of Offer and Calderbank letters can materially affect the ultimate costs position of parties in patent disputes.  However, their effectiveness depends on factors such as the stage of proceedings, available evidence, and the overall conduct of the parties.

As seen in Samsung Bioepis v Janssen, the Court will not grant indemnity costs without exceptional circumstances justifying such an order.  Similarly, in Rakman International v Boss Fire & Safety, the Full Court emphasised that an offer to merely discontinue proceedings, leaving fundamental issues unresolved, may not trigger the costs consequences under the Federal Court Rules.  Finally, Stasiuk v Monster Energy Au highlights the importance of compliance with court orders and the risks involved in rejecting reasonable settlement offers.

About Pearce IP

Pearce IP is a boutique firm offering intellectual property specialist lawyers, patent attorneys and trade mark attorneys to the life sciences industries (in particular, pharmaceutical, biopharmaceutical, biotech, ag-tech and food tech).  Pearce IP is the 2021 ‘Intellectual Property Team of the Year’ (Lawyers Weekly Australian Law Awards) and was shortlisted for the same award in 2022.  Pearce IP is ranked in IAM Patent 1000 and Managing IP (MIP) IP Stars, in Australasian Lawyer 5 Star Awards as a ‘5 Star’ firm, and the Legal 500 APAC Guide for Intellectual Property.

Our leaders have been recognised in virtually every notable IP listing for their legal, patent and trade mark excellence including: IAM Patent 1000, IAM Strategy 300, MIP IP Stars, Doyles Guide, WIPR Leaders, 5 Star IP Lawyers, Best Lawyers, and Australasian Lawyer 5 Star Awards, and have been honoured with many awards including Australian Law Awards – IP Partner of the Year, Women in Law Awards – Partner of the Year, Women in Business Law Awards - Patent Lawyer of the Year (Asia Pacific), Most Influential Lawyers (Changemaker), among other awards.

QIP Nominees Pty Ltd. v Dana-Farber Cancer Institute, Inc. and The General Hospital Corporation [2024] APO 33

Background

Delegate Wagg of the Australian Patent Office has ruled in favour of Dana-Farber Cancer Institute, Inc. and The General Hospital Corporation (the Applicants) in “straw person” opposition proceedings brought by QIP Nominees Pty Ltd (QIP), a company within the QANTM intellectual property group.

QIP failed on all grounds it argued, including sufficiency, support, utility, novelty, inventive step and manner of manufacture.  Delegate Wagg’s decision highlights the central importance of expert evidence when mounting an invalidity challenge.  QIP’s failure to support key invalidity grounds, such as sufficiency, support and utility, with adequate expert evidence led to the Delegate rejecting these grounds of invalidity.

The proceedings related to divisional application AU2018206769 (the Opposed Application) entitled ‘Compositions and methods of identifying tumor specific neoantigens’.

The claim the subject of the Opposed Application is for a personalised cancer treatment approach that identifies and utilises tumor-specific neoepitopes for cancer vaccines.  The method involves three main steps:

1. Identification of DNA mutations by comparing whole genome, whole exome, or RNA sequencing of a patient’s tumor cells to their normal cells.

2. Application of validated peptide-MHC binding prediction algorithms to generate candidate T cell epitopes that may bind to the patient’s HLA alleles, based on non-silent mutations present in the tumor.

3. Optional demonstration of antigen-specific T cells against the peptides or demonstration that a candidate peptide binds to HLA proteins on the tumor surface.

This approach results in a patient-specific and tumor-specific composition comprising at least four peptides, each representing a different tumor neoepitope.  These peptides are predicted to bind to the patient’s HLA alleles with high affinity (IC50 < 150 nM) and represent expression products of subject-specific and tumor-specific mutations absent in the patient’s normal cells.

Key Issues

Construction and Clarity

The Delegate first considered how the claims would be construed and whether he agreed with QIP’s allegation of lack of clarity.

One of the key issues on construction was whether, in the context of the claims of the Opposed Application, a distinction should be drawn between “a method of treatment” claim (the formulation used in the Opposed Application) and a “method for treatment” claim.  The Delegate did not agree that there was “much of a distinction”, but noted that in every case the claims are to be construed in the context of the specification, the terms used and what it means to the skilled person.  The Delegate agreed with the Applicants’ construction of the Opposed Application’s method of treatment claims, stating that the method of treatment indicates that the claim must treat the particular condition.

The Delegate then went on to consider a range of terms which QIP had alleged were unclear.  The Delegate noted that a claim will be clear if a person skilled in the art could ascertain “whether or not what he proposes to do falls within the ambit of the claim”.  The lack of a precise definition in claims may not be fatal so long as the claims provide a workable standard suitable to the intended use.  However, if the monopoly defined by the claims cannot be determined, then the claims must fail for want of clarity.

Although QIP did not file submissions on clarity, QIP’s Statement of Grounds and Particulars alleged that:

1. The words “neoantigen”, “neoepitope” and “mutant peptide” used in the claims were unclear as they were used interchangeably, and that the phrase “at least 4” was vague and open-ended.  The Delegate disagreed, finding that a skilled person would be familiar with these terms and their meanings in context and that they denoted a minimum of 4 peptides, with no maximum specified.  No evidence was submitted that these terms would be unclear to a skilled person.

2. The phrases “bind to”, “is predicted to bind”, “the class I HLA allele”, and “IC50 of less than 150 nM” were unclear.  The Delegate disagreed, finding that these terms provided workable standards and limitations, and that there was no evidence that specific affinities were required in this technology or that the terms were unclear.

Sufficiency

QIP argued that the specification did not disclose the invention in a manner which is clear enough and complete enough for the invention to be performed by a person skilled in the art.  QIP contended that:

1. Not all peptides with predicted binding would work, the IC50 threshold of less than 150nM was arbitrary, and that it was implausible that everything within the scope of the claims would work.  QIP relied on expert evidence that if large-scale testing was done, it is likely that more peptides with a predicted IC50 of less than 150 would show an experimentally determined IC50 of greater than 500.  In reply, the Applicants relied on expert evidence which showed that all but one of the peptides with a predicted IC50 below 150nM had an experimentally determined IC50 of less than 500nM.  In dismissing QIP’s arguments, the Delegate relied on the Applicants’ expert evidence, noting that large-scale testing would merely provide a low probability that one could end up with a composition where all four peptides in the composition failed.  The Delegate also note that QIP had not provided any calculations of this probability or evidence as to additional peptides wherein the predicted and experimental binding affinities are inconsistent.

2. The claims, being directed to “cancer”, could not satisfy the sufficiency requirements as it would be unlikely that all cancers could be treated this way.  The Delegate disagreed, finding that the method’s reliance on cancer-specific neoepitopes made it applicable to various cancer types.  QIP had not provided evidence of cancers without neoepitopes or mutated peptides.

3. Carrying out the invention would be an undue burden.  The Delegate disagreed, finding that the specification provided the methodology.  While the application of the methodology to the specific patient required work (using genomics, algorithms and assays), the amount of work required to perform the invention was not of a type that would give rise to a lack of clear enough or complete enough disclosure.

Consequently, QIP failed to establish this ground.

Support

On Support, QIP relied on their sufficiency submissions that the claims were directed to a method of treating any cancer, yet the specification did not show the treatment of any cancer.  The Delegate acknowledged that the specification did not include treatment that one would expect in a clinical study and instead included cell-based assays.  Nevertheless, the Delegate identified the technical contribution of the invention as a method involving: (i) identifying epitopes in an individual’s own cancer cells; (ii) screening them for epitopes with a predicted binding of less than 150nM; and (iii) using at least four of them for a vaccine.  The Delegate reasoned that it would logically follow that this methodology would work in all cancers that produce epitopes.  As QIP did not file evidence of cancers that do not produce epitopes, the Delegate concluded that the claims did not exceed the technical contribution to the art.

Utility

QIP argued that the claims failed for inutility on a number of grounds, including because they did not inevitably meet the promise of treating cancer, lacked specificity in peptide amount, and failed to provide data supporting treatment across all cancer types.  QIP also raised concerns about the effectiveness of peptides with predicted binding, the open-ended nature of the “at least four” peptides claim, and the lack of data on combinations with additional therapeutics.

QIP ultimately failed to prove inutility due to a lack of evidence, with the Delegate noting that “utility essentially requires evidence of something within the scope of the claim failing to meet the promise”.

Novelty

QIP relied on three scientific papers for novelty.  The Delegate rejected QIP’s arguments, finding that none of the cited scientific publications provided clear and unmistakable directions to make the invention claimed in the Opposed Application.  In the case of two of the scientific publications, the Delegate considered that they looked to the future, for one publication the future of what an “ideal” vaccine would be (rather than providing specific instructions on how to achieve it), and for the other publication a future approach which did not outline specific features of the claims (such as using at least 4 peptides and screening to a threshold of IC50 of <150nM).  In the case of the third scientific publication, the Delegate considered that it did not disclose the use of whole genome sequencing (instead focusing on easily amplified areas of the genome), used a different IC50 threshold (500nM) than the claimed invention, and did not require at least 4 peptides to be used in any future immunological composition and method.

Inventive Step

The Opponent argued lack of inventive step based on common general knowledge (CGK) alone and in combination with prior art documents.

The Delegate first considered and rejected the lack of inventive step case based on CGK alone.  In reaching this conclusion, the Delegate addressed the parties’ submissions on CGK, finding that:

1. Neoantigens formed part of the CGK, given that the parties’ experts agreed that neoantigens were known in the field before the priority date and the Opposed Application discussed neoantigens and cited several documents discussing neoantigens.

2. Use of neoantigens in cancer vaccines appeared to be an area of interest to some research groups, but how widely known they were or their use in cancer vaccines had not been established as CGK.

3. Whole genome sequencing and cancer gene sequencing were known at the priority date.  The Delegate relied on the experts’ evidence to form this conclusion, noting that he did not consider that the prior art documents that used sequencing constituted sufficient evidence on their own to establish CGK in the field.

4. Algorithmic prediction of epitopes for HLA proteins was known before the priority date, however, the evidence did not establish how widely known or used these algorithms were in the field.

5. Rammensee et al., (2008) Genomics and Personalized Medicine “Cancer Vaccines: Some Basic Considerations” did not form part of the CGK.  In particular, there was no evidence to show that its contents were widely known or accepted.

The Delegate then considered whether the claimed invention lacked an inventive step when compared to the CGK in combination with three prior art documents which had previously been considered for the ground of novelty.  The Delegate rejected the lack of inventive step case based on the CGK and each of the prior art documents taken separately, finding that:

1. In the case of two of the prior art publications, while they suggested an ideal vaccine involving whole genome sequencing using algorithms to find potential epitopes or an “ultimate strategy” for cancer vaccines involving whole genome sequencing:

• there were key differences between the prior art publications and the invention claimed in the Opposed Application such as the IC50 threshold of 150nM and the use at least four peptides; or
• they did not provide guidance on the IC50 threshold or use of at least four peptides.

2. In the case of the third prior art publication, it did not teach the use of whole genomic sequencing, used a different IC50 threshold (500nM) than the claimed invention and did not suggest that at least four peptides are to be used.

Manner of Manufacture

QIP submitted that the requisite threshold of invention was not met as the methods of identifying subject and tumor-specific peptides were known in the art and would have been considered by a skilled person for use in cancer vaccines.  The Delegate rejected this argument, noting that there was nothing on the face of the Opposed Application to suggest a lack of inventiveness, and the mere assertion that a skilled person would have thought about using neoantigens for a cancer vaccine was insufficient.

Outcome

Ultimately, QIP failed on all grounds that it argued.  The Delegate directed that the Opposed Application proceed to grant and awarded costs against QIP.

Implications

The decision of Delegate Wagg offers a number of important lessons.  In particular, Delegate Wagg’s decision emphasises:

1. the central importance of expert evidence when mounting an invalidity challenge.  QIP’s failure to support key invalidity grounds, such as sufficiency, support and utility, with adequate expert evidence led to the Delegate rejecting these grounds of invalidity;

2. the high bar that must be met to invalidate a patent on the basis of novelty; and

3. the challenges in establishing CGK in evolving fields.  Although the prior art discussed and considered neoantigen use in cancer vaccines and whole genome sequencing, this was merely a ‘promising research area’ and not widely accepted at the time.

About Pearce IP

Pearce IP is a boutique firm offering intellectual property specialist lawyers, patent attorneys and trade mark attorneys to the life sciences industries (in particular, pharmaceutical, biopharmaceutical, biotech, ag-tech and food tech).  Pearce IP is the 2021 ‘Intellectual Property Team of the Year’ (Lawyers Weekly Australian Law Awards) and was shortlisted for the same award in 2022.  Pearce IP is ranked in IAM Patent 1000 and Managing IP (MIP) IP Stars, in Australasian Lawyer 5 Star Awards as a ‘5 Star’ firm, and the Legal 500 APAC Guide for Intellectual Property.

Our leaders have been recognised in virtually every notable IP listing for their legal, patent and trade mark excellence including: IAM Patent 1000, IAM Strategy 300, MIP IP Stars, Doyles Guide, WIPR Leaders, 5 Star IP Lawyers, Best Lawyers, and Australasian Lawyer 5 Star Awards, and have been honoured with many awards including Australian Law Awards – IP Partner of the Year, Women in Law Awards – Partner of the Year, Women in Business Law Awards - Patent Lawyer of the Year (Asia Pacific), Most Influential Lawyers (Changemaker), among other awards.